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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, in the wake of the largest political scandal in Ameri-
can history, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA).2 This law, the first of its kind in history, targets U.S. citi-
zens and companies who bribe foreign officials.3 After twenty years of
almost no enforcement, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began aggressively enforc-
ing the FCPA in the early 2000s. Facing the threat of massive fines,
the U.S. and U.S.-affiliated companies began pulling back from invest-
ing in countries that were perceived as “corrupt.” While this is one of
the specific goals of the FCPA, there have also been unintended conse-
quences. In particular, this law has harmed countries that have a his-
tory of corruption, but because of some form of major internal strife
ending recently, are in the perfect position for U.S. companies to enter
1 Candidate for J.D., 2015 at the University of Richmond School of Law.
2 Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
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their market and positively influence the development of a more trans-
parent market.
This paper examines whether the current exception to the
FCPA, or the affirmative defenses provided by the FCPA, allow Ameri-
can companies to be this positive influence. Part I examines the back-
ground of the FCPA, the current exception and affirmative defenses,
and the recent increase in enforcement. Part II examines the issue of
whether the current exceptions and affirmative defenses permit US
companies to invest in countries currently exiting major internal
strife.4 Unfortunately, neither the exception nor the affirmative de-
fenses provide companies the leeway necessary to enter these markets
without serious risk of running afoul of the FCPA enforcers. Part IV
argues that a new affirmative defense should be enacted, creating a
system where companies can approach the DOJ and SEC with an out-
line of a strong compliance program and receive permission to enter
these countries without fear of being targeted for investigation.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act currently hurts nations
coming out of recent internal strife by dis-incentivizing companies
from entering into these markets. As none of the current exceptions or
affirmative defenses allow companies to enter these new markets, a
new exception should be created allowing companies to pre-register
with the U.S. government and enter these markets.
II. THE CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FCPA
A. Events Leading to the Enacting of the FCPA
The road to the FCPA began on the night of June 17, 1972,
with the arrest of five men inside the Democratic National Commit-
tee’s office in the Watergate complex.5 These arrests precipated the
biggest political scandal in United States history and led to the resig-
nation of President Richard Nixon two years later, in August 1974.6
While the larger story of Watergate is well known, the subplot leading
to the first law to target corruption by domestic companies in foreign
countries is not.7 The need for this new law became apparent during
the Watergate investigations when the Special Prosecutor, Archibald
Cox, requested that companies that had made questionable or illegal
contributions to the 1972 Presidential Campaign voluntarily disclose
4 For the purposes of this paper, major internal strife is defined as a natural disas-
ter, civil war, or political upheaval.
5 Watergate Retrospective: The Decline and Fall, TIME, August 19, 1974.
6 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH. POST, August 9, 1974, at A01.
7 See Alejandro Posadas, Combatting Corruption under International Law, 10
DUKE J.  COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 348 (2000) (providing an excellent overview of how
the FCPA arose out of the Watergate Scandal).
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that fact.8 Many of these disclosures, which were later turned over to
U.S. agencies, indicated that these companies were not only making
questionable payments to American political campaigns, but also to
foreign governments and political parties.
With this information, the SEC began to investigate payments
from U.S. companies to foreign officials. They began in 1975 by investi-
gating five companies—Gulf Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany, Northrop Corporation, and Ashland Oil—for violations of the
reporting requirements of U.S. Securities law.9 The SEC simultane-
ously began a separate investigation into United Brands after its
Chairman, Eli Black, threw himself off the twenty-second floor of a
New York City skyscraper.10 During the investigation, it came to light
that Mr. Black had paid the Honduran government $2.5 million to re-
peal a tax on bananas.11 The SEC, relying on the laws at the time,
found this payment to be a materially relevant payment for reporting
purposes, and charged United Brands with violations of the U.S. se-
curities laws.12 This demonstrates how the contemporary laws in 1975
had to deal with actions covered by the FCPA today.
Meanwhile, in both houses of the U.S. Congress, the commit-
tees on Foreign Relations began their own investigations into the prac-
tices of multinational companies. After initially holding several closed
hearings, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held its first
public hearing on May 16, 1975.13 By making these hearings public,
the Senate did much to show transparency in an area where the pri-
mary problem is secrecy. These hearings, along with those that fol-
lowed, produced extensive information on business and government
corruption and highlighted the need for major reform.14 In particular,
8 See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. of For-
eign Relations, 94th Cong. 5 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 76-S381-6 (Cong.
Info. Serv.).
9 See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on
International Relations, 94th Cong. 37 (1975), microformed on CIS No. 76-H461-15
(Cong. Info. Serv.).
10 See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 656 (1984).
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, supra note 8,
at 1.
14 See NOONAN, supra note 10, at XVI. The legislative history of the FCPA is ex-
tensive. See, e.g., Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy,
supra note 8; The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad,
supra note 9; Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976), microformed
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the hearings showed how the authority vested in the regulatory agen-
cies to deal with foreign payments at the time was in need of major
bolstering.15 These conclusions, along with the details from the vari-
ous SEC investigations, led Congress to conclude that it was time to
focus on this issue.
B. Passing the FCPA
By late 1975, Congress had examined government corruption
both at home and abroad, and it faced the realization that the current
regulatory scheme was inadequate. To fix this inadequacy, Congress
would undertake the unenviable task of creating a new type of law
targeting bribes occurring outside of U.S. boundaries.16 This law was
the first of its kind, and it laid the foundation for similar efforts by
other nations in the past twenty years.17 But how did it come to be,
and what exactly does it say?
After the various investigations surrounding the issues Water-
gate raised, Congress began to focus on building a new regulatory
scheme. In May 1976, the SEC submitted an intensive report to the
Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee concerning
questionable and illegal corporate payments and practices.18 This re-
port showed that, out of the ninety-five companies involved in the re-
port, fifty-nine had been involved in some form of payment to foreign
officials, seventeen had paid foreign political parties, twenty-nine had
had been involved in sales-type commissions, and twenty-seven were
involved in “other foreign matters” including some sort of foreign pay-
ment or questionable activity.19 Combining all of these payments, the
total amount spent by these companies on questionable payments was
approximately $250 million.20 What this report really showed was
on CIS No. 76-S241-38 (Cong. Info. Serv.); Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic
and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing on S. 305 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977), microformed on CIS No.
77-S241-23 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
15 See The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad, supra note
9, at 40–47 (1975).
16 It should be noted that this is not the first time that the U.S. Congress had done
this. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).
17 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1; see also Bribery Act,
2010, c. 23 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23.
18 See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Il-
legal Corporate Payments and Practices Submitted to the Senate Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs Committee, reprinted in 353 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 36–41
(1976).
19 Id at 9.
20 Id. at 16–41.
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that, contrary to popular belief, these payments were neither rare nor
miniscule, and a major legislative push was needed to root out this
corruption.
Simultaneously, both the House of Representatives and the
Senate took up this issue. In the House, the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations focused its efforts on this problem, while the Commit-
tees on Foreign Relations and on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
took it up in the Senate.21  By that summer, it became apparent that
some action would occur. The only question was what that action
would be.
At this point, another branch of government entered the mix.
After the Watergate scandal, President Nixon had resigned, leaving
Vice President Gerald Ford, a former Representative in the House, to
assume the Presidency. In the summer of 1976, President Ford re-
leased his legislative proposal on the issue of foreign payments.22 His
proposal focused on the reporting responsibilities of U.S. companies for
large foreign payments, but unlike some other proposals, Ford was not
in favor of criminalizing the payments if they complied with existing
law.23 This was a conservative approach that would have allowed the
market to police itself, instead of relying on the government to
interfere.
Unfortunately for President Ford, Congress opted to take a dif-
ferent approach. After passing drafts several times, the Senate chose
to pursue a stricter approach proposed by Senator Proxmire, which in-
cluded criminalizing both failing to report foreign payments and mak-
ing those payments in the first place.24 Eventually, both the House
and the Senate approved the Senate Bill, and President Jimmy Carter
signed the FCPA into law on December 19, 1977.25
21 See Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearing on S. 3133 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976), microformed on CIS No.
76-S241-38 (Cong. Info. Serv.); Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and For-
eign Investment Disclosure: Hearing on S. 305 Before the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977), microformed on CIS No. 77-
S241-23 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
22 See H.R. Doc. No. 94-572, at 1 (1974).
23 The reports would have flowed through the Secretary of Commerce, who would
have made the reports available to other agencies such as the IRS, the SEC, and
the DOJ. Additionally, the Secretary of Commerce would have provided Congress
with the reports as well.  After a year these reports would have been made public,
except when the State Department or Attorney General determined they should be
withheld for reasons of foreign relations or judicial process. See id. at 2.
24 S. 3664, 94th Cong. (1975).
25 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994)).
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Since being originally passed, Congress has amended the law
twice, once in the late 1980s and again in the late 1990s.26  The first
amendment simply reaffirmed Congress’s commitment to combating
foreign corruption, while the second was to enact changes in line with
the requirements of the Organization for Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) agreement concerning bribery.27 Neither of these
amendments fundamentally changed the FCPA, but they do show that
Congress’ desire to promote transparency and cooperation, while fight-
ing corruption through the FCPA continues. This article proposes that
further changes should be made to the FCPA without compromising
either of these goals.
C. FCPA Structure
The FCPA is comprised of two major parts: first, the provisions
that make bribing a foreign official a crime (i.e. the foreign corrupt
practice); and, second, changes to required accounting practices.28
Since this article is concerned with the current affirmative defenses
and exceptions, it will focus primarily on the part of the statute cover-
ing what constitutes a corrupt practice, by examining what actions
Congress prohibited, who the statute covers, and then outline what
the current exception and affirmative defenses are.
The FCPA criminalizes offers of payment, or payment of any-
thing of value, to foreign officials, foreign political parties, or third par-
ties for the purpose of influencing their decisions in the accused
favor.29 While this sounds like simply a prohibition on an American
Hustle-style exchange of a briefcase of cash in a hotel room,30 it is a bit
more complicated than that. By targeting the offering of anything of
value, the statute significantly expands the scope of what it covers to
include things such as expensive trips and non-monetary gifts. Addi-
tionally, the statute targets actions by third parties likely meant to
insulate the American company from liability.31 At its core, the statute
targets any activity meant to give companies an unfair advantage over
the marketplace.
26 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107; see also International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302.
27 See 102 Stat. 1107; see also 112 Stat. 3302.
28 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994).
29 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a).
30 See AMERICAN HUSTLE (Columbia Pictures 2013) (the movie tells a fictionalized
version of the ABSCAM events, where multiple public officials including a Senator
and several House of Representative members were convicted of public
corruption).
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
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The FCPA applies to a wide swath of the American corporate
community. The statute specifically calls out two large groups of peo-
ple.32 First, the statute covers issuers of securities on U.S. markets
(i.e. companies).33  Second, the statute targets officers, directors, em-
ployees, stockholders, or agents of these corporations.34 Specifically
targeting both corporations and the people involved in corporations
covers most of the entities involved in the actions targeted by the
FCPA, but how does the statute reach them. The statute lays out two
jurisdictional “hooks”35 for prosecuting these crimes. The first is the
use of mail or any other means of interstate commerce in furtherance
of a foreign corrupt practice.36 The second is where there have been
foreign corrupt practices outside the United States.37 Additionally, the
statute allows liability to extend to foreign companies and foreign nat-
ural persons, their officers, directors, employees, agents, and stock-
holders when actions occurring in furtherance of the corrupt practices
occur while in U.S. territory.38 As such, the FCPA has a wide reach,
but the statute does give some breathing room through the exception
and affirmative defenses.
There is currently one exception and two affirmative defenses
to the FCPA. The exception is for routine government action.39 This
sole exception protects companies from liability in situations where
payment is simply to get the ball moving on the process. This excep-
tion, generally known as the “grease payments exception,” allows pay-
ments that merely expedite the process. Thinking about these
payments as procedural payments, like fees to expedite permits, helps
to distinguish them from prohibited payments meant to bypass the
market making its determination.
In addition to the exception, two affirmative defenses to FCPA
liability also exist. The first defense pertains to payments that are law-
ful under the foreign country’s laws.40 This is a fairly traditional de-
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 This terminology of jurisdictional hooks is adapted from Magistrate Judge No-
vak from the Eastern District of Virginia. It means the same thing as the tradi-
tional bases for jurisdiction.
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a).
37 See id. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(h)(i), amended by International Anti-Bribery and
Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302.
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(1).
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b). The exception, as well as the two affirmative de-
fenses, was added in the 1988 amendment to the FCPA. The fact that the original
bill did not contain any exceptions or defenses says something about how strongly
the enacting Congress felt about corruption.
40 Id. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
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fense in U.S. laws governing actions outside the United States, as it
follows a similar exception in U.S. labor law, which allows companies
to discriminate if not doing so would violate the foreign country’s
law.41 The desire to see a level playing field lies at the core of this
defense. In all situations, the United States wants American compa-
nies to have an equal chance at earning business. If it holds them lia-
ble for actions that are legal in the country in question, it unfairly
handicaps its companies.
The second affirmative defense is the reasonable and bona fide
expenditure defense. This defense frees companies from liability when
“the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value. . .was a rea-
sonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging ex-
penses. . .and was directly related to—the promotion, demonstration,
or explanation of products or services; or the execution or performance
of a contract with a foreign government or agency.”42 The best way to
think about this is to distinguish between an American manufacturer
flying a Chinese official in to show him some new product or system
and paying for the flight, his hotel, and his meals while the company
was hosting him. These would all likely be considered reasonable bona
fide expenditures, but if the company had the flight stop in Las Vegas
for four days and picked up the entire tab, it likely would be considered
an illegal payment. The point with this defense is that the actions
must be what you would expect a company to do in that case, nothing
more.
D. Current Enforcement Actions
One might think that these exceptions and defenses sound
fairly broad, but by looking at some of the enforcement actions involv-
ing the FCPA, one can get an idea of how the FCPA could be improved.
Up until the early 2000s, the FCPA was rarely enforced and companies
continued doing what they had always done.43 In 2008, Siemens, a
German conglomerate, was hit with fines over a billion dollars for
their regular practice of sending suitcases of money with their agents
to South America to further business interests.44 In 2011, the SEC hit
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1967).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
43 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Enforcement Actions:
FCPA Cases, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml.
44 See Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2008/December/08-crm-1105.html; see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15,
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
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Siemens again with charges against some of its directors for a bribery
scheme involving identification cards in Argentina. In 2013, one of
these directors settled for a $275,000 fine.45
While not the first of the current stream of FCPA actions, the
Siemens case does show several important points about current prac-
tice. First, the SEC and the DOJ have gotten very serious about polic-
ing violations. Second, most cases, like Siemens, settle out of court, but
are multi-layered and can go on for years. Finally, the fines levied
against these companies are massive, often millions or even billions of
dollars.
Another good example of this trend is the fines levied against
KBR, Inc. and Halliburton Co. for bribes to Nigerian officials over a
ten-year period in order to obtain construction contracts, as well as
record violations.46 Once again, this was the conclusion of a long-term
investigation and negotiations over the fine. In this case, the various
entities agreed to pay a total of $579 million in fines ($177 million to
the SEC and $402 million to the DOJ).47
Up until recently, Siemens was the poster child for FCPA en-
forcement, but in the last two years, the focus has shifted to the next
big case, Wal-Mart. In April 2012, the New York Times ran a piece
detailing how Wal-Mart’s Mexican subsidiary paid $24 million in
bribes for licenses to expand throughout the country.48 As Wal-Mart
began its internal investigation into possible FCPA violations, the cost
of the investigation began to explode as the breadth of corruption be-
came apparent.49 It became clear that these bribes were not only oc-
curring in Mexico, but also in other parts of the world, primarily in
India and China.50 As the investigation spread, the cost to keep it go-
ing ballooned, and by August of 2013 they had spent $300 million on
simply investigating the bribes.51 This says nothing of the actual cost
of the bribes or the potential fines from both the SEC and the DOJ.
Neither agency has given any indication of what the likely fine will be,
45 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion v. Uriel Sharef, et al., Litigation Release No. 22676 (April 16, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22676.htm.
46 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton
for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2009/2009-23.htm.
47 Id.
48 David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart after Top-
Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 22, 2012), at A1.
49 Richard L. Cassin, Wal-Mart’s Whopping FCPA Tab—$300 Million and Climb-
ing, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/8/
16/wal-marts-whopping-fcpa-tab-300-million-and-climbing.html.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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but considering how widespread the problem was, it is possible that
Wal-Mart’s fine will be the largest in history.
E. The FCPA’s Collateral Damage to Countries in Desperate Need
of Aid
After having established the origin and function of the FCPA,
this article will now turn to the issue at hand. While the FCPA’s goal
of eradicating corruption is a noble one that should be supported, there
is great potential for overzealousness to harm the very countries the
law is trying to protect. The countries most at risk are those countries
that are exiting a period of major internal strife. For the purposes of
this paper, major internal strife is considered to be either a long period
of government upheaval/civil war or a major natural disaster. These
countries are often put in a situation where they are in desperate need
of aid from foreign nations and companies, and are also prime loca-
tions for investment. They are often hamstrung, however, by the fact
that they have a history of corruption, or a fear by foreign companies
that simply entering these markets could lead to greater scrutiny from
U.S. regulators.
One such country is South Sudan. South Sudan, the youngest
nation in the world, came into existence in July 2011, after a January
referendum where 98% of the population voted to separate from Sudan
and create their own nation.52 This was the culmination of negotia-
tions to end an on-going civil war that engulfed Sudan since 1955.53 As
one would expect, the creation of South Sudan was met with excite-
ment on an international level.54 As South Sudan is a land-locked
country whose primary source of revenue is oil, it was in desperate
need of foreign investors to help build their fledgling economy. Unfor-
tunately for South Sudan, the country faced several major hurdles.
One of the primary hurdles South Sudan faced in attracting
foreign direct investment (FDI) was the perception of South Sudan be-
ing linked to corruption. One major contributor was the country’s score
on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The Corruption Perception
Index is a score of 1 to 100 given to each nation in the world annually
52 See Central Intelligence Agency, Background, CIA World Factbook: South Su-
dan, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
od.html (last updated May 12, 2014).
53 Id.
54 See Will Connors & Maggie Fick, At South Sudan’s Birth, Eyes Are on North-
erner, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
052702304793504576434052777444130?KEYWORDS=South+Sudan.
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by Transparency International.55 For both 2011 and 2012, South Su-
dan was not given a score.56 This alone would deter foreign investors,
but on top of that, in both years, Sudan, the country South Sudan split
from, scored in the bottom five in the world.57 Why would a company
in its right mind decide to enter such an environment when other com-
panies are shelling out millions of dollars in fines every year out of fear
of being found guilty of violating the FCPA? Sadly with South Sudan,
the country may have missed their opportunity to attract necessary
foreign investors, as the country has once again descended into civil
war.
Another example of a nation exiting major internal strife is Ha-
iti in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit that island in 2010.58
Like South Sudan, Haiti has a history of corruption problems, and the
earthquake did not help this perception. Prior to the earthquake, Haiti
was ranked 168 out of 180 countries that had been given scores.59
Since the earthquake, they have seen almost no progress and are cur-
rently ranked 163 out of 177.60 Like South Sudan, this perception of
corruption, whether accurate or not, has seriously harmed Haiti’s re-
covery since the earthquake.
Luckily for Haiti, their plight has not gone unnoticed. In the
aftermath of the Haitian earthquake several people began to advocate
for changes to the FCPA to allow U.S. companies to enter Haiti and
help rebuild both structurally and economically.61 In particular, peo-
55 See Corruption Perception Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
(2013), http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (last visited Apr. 12,
2014).
56 See Corruption Perception Index: Results 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
(2013), http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results; see also Corruption Percep-
tion Index: Results 2012”, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2013), http://
www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
57 See Corruption Perception Index: Results 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
(2013), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results; see also Corrup-
tion Perception Index: Results 2012, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2013), http://
www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
58 See Jose´ de Co´rdoba and David Luhnow, Fierce Earthquake Rocks Haiti, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 13, 2010.
59 See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, TRANS-
PARENCY INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVE SITE, http://archive.transparency.org/policy_re-
search/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.
60 See Transparency International, Corruption by Country: Haiti, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL (2013), http://www.transparency.org/country#HTI_DataResearch_
SurveysIndices.
61 See Tyler Cowen, One of the Best Ways to Help Haiti: Modify FCPA, MARGINAL
REVOLUTION (March 15, 2010, 9:24 AM) http://marginalrevolution.com/
marginalrevolution/2010/03/one-of-the-best-ways-to-help-haiti.html; see also
Ashby Jones, Is the FCPA Standing in the Way of Haiti’s Recovery?, WALL ST. J. L.
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ple were calling for the FCPA to be waived for a period to allow US
companies to enter the market and provide the necessary services.62
Sadly, this advice went unheeded and Haiti has continued to languish
in the hands of a system where paying to play is the norm.
The point of both of these examples is to show how, for some
countries, the FCPA actually hinders their development rather than
helping it. Whether or not a country is corrupt, the fact that some
countries’ development is hurt as collateral damage necessitates ex-
amination of the current policy.
III. CAN CURRENT STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES ALLOW FOR ENCOURAGING U.S. COMPANIES TO INVEST
IN THESE COUNTRIES?
A. Motivating Hypothetical
In order to evaluate whether current exceptions and affirma-
tive defenses provide companies adequate room to enter into business
in nations exiting major internal strife we will need a case to serve as
the instrument of the evaluation. While a real world example would be
great, it is far simpler to demonstrate the principles of this article
through the use of a hypothetical situation. As a result, the next sec-
tion of this article will be analyzed through the lens of the following
hypothetical.
Imagepriority (IP),63 is a U.S. corporation incorporated in Dela-
ware that specializes in the design, manufacture, and installation of
commercial signage.64 In recent years, IP has seen rapid growth both
domestically and internationally. In particular, one client, McBurger
Joint, has just contracted IP to manufacture and install all their
signage in the Middle East and Africa. In order to cut down costs and
potentially open new markets, the president of the company, Mark
Morin, decided to open a factory in South Sudan due to its emerging
economy and his sympathy for the South Sudanese people.
Additionally, Morin was comforted by the fact that South Su-
dan seems to be making an effort to fight internal corruption.65 Two
BLOG (Mar. 16, 2010, 4:10 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/03/16/is-the-fcpa-
standing-in-the-way-of-haitis-recovery/.
62 Id.
63 IP is a fictional company, but is based on an industry with which I have some
experience.
64 Commercial signage includes all sorts of signage from the McDonald’s arches to
the cases surrounding ATMs. See, e.g., Architectural Graphics Incorporated, YOU-
TUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I85VW4ALj1c (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
65 See The South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission Act, § 3, (2009) (S. Sudan),
available at http://southsudanngoforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Anti-
Corruption%20Commission%20Act%202009.pdf; see also Penal Code Act of 2008
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years after opening the factory business is going well, but it comes to
Morin’s attention that the SEC and DOJ have begun an investigation
into IP’s Sudanese facility and several payments made by the head of
manufacturing, Miles Gardner, to Sudanese officials. IP opens their
own investigation run by their outside counsel into the payments. The
investigation finds that the purpose of the payments is not clear.
B. Exceptions and Defenses Applied
Using this hypothetical, this article will examine each of the
current exceptions and affirmative defenses to see if IP is protected by
any of them. The exception for facilitating payments will be analyzed
first. The statute specifically exempts “facilitating or expediting pay-
ment[s] to a foreign official . . . . the purpose of which is to expedite or
to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a for-
eign official . . . .”66 For the exception to apply, the question is whether
the payment is serving solely the role of speeding up the process and
not influencing selection of a winner.67
Applying this to our situation, we see that the actions of Gard-
ner, IP’s head of manufacturing, do not fall under this exception. Un-
less the payments are to expedite the process, they do not fall under
this exception. As the payments in this case are for an unclear pur-
pose, they would likely not fall under this exception. This results in IP
likely remaining liable for the payments. The facilitating payments ex-
ception does not help IP in their effort to continue operating in South
Sudan.
Next is the analysis under the affirmative defenses. The first of
these is the defense that the payments were lawful under the law of
the foreign country.68  This defense is meant to protect U.S. companies
from being caught between what is required by the U.S. and a foreign
country’s laws.69 Payments to government officials are illegal under
several sections of South Sudan’s Penal Code and are punishable by up
to ten years in prison.70 Therefore, these payments were not permissi-
ble under South Sudanese law  and IP cannot raise the affirmative de-
§§ 88–93, 1 The Southern Sudan Gazette 1 (Supp. 2009) (S. Sudan) (South Sudan
like many countries has an anti-corruption act, but enforcement of that law is less
strenuous than it should be) [hereinafter Penal Code Act].
66 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).
67 R. Christopher Cook & Stephanie Connor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
An Overview, 3–4 (Jones Day 2010), available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/
Publication/3325b9a8-b3b6-40ff-8bc8-0c10c119c649/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/d375c9ee-6a11-4d25-9c30-0d797661b5ff/FCPA%20Overview.pdf.
68 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
69 Cook & Connor, supra note 67, at 4.
70 See Penal Code Act, supra note 65, at § 88.
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fense that the payments were lawful under foreign law. This leaves
them one other option under current law.
The last affirmative defense IP can rely on is the defense of
reasonable and bona fide expenditure. The statute provides the de-
fense when the “payment. . .was a reasonable and bona fide expendi-
ture[s]. . .incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official. . .was directly
related to (A) the promotion. . .of products or services; or (B) the execu-
tion or performance of contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof.”71 The DOJ has previously stated that luxury travel provided
for foreign officials may form the basis of an FCPA charge.72 In this
case, this affirmative defense does not get IP very far since in no funds
were spent on travel and lodging for officials or visits to the United
States. However, even if such expenditures occurred, the defense could
not be extended to protect IP for the other payments.
Ultimately, what this shows is that a company with good inten-
tions can suddenly find itself in FCPA trouble for actions by its em-
ployees or even accidental actions.
Lest anyone think that this issue is being overblown, the Wall
Street Journal recently ran an article on a situation that highlights my
point exactly. In the run-up to the 2011 overthrow of former Libyan
President Moammar Gadhafi, Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co, and several other major investment companies,
with the encouragement and support of the U.S. government, began
working with the Libya Fund, a state-run investment group.73 In the
aftermath of the Libyan Revolution these relationships attracted the
attention of the new government.74 What they discovered was a net-
work centering on middlemen known as “fixers.”75 These “fixers” es-
tablished the connections between the investment firms and the
individuals with the connections with developing countries, including
Libya.76 Whether these fixers are funneling money is one of the big
questions in this case.77 One transaction under scrutiny is a $120 mil-
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2)–(c)(2)(B).
72 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. 08-03, FCPA Review Opinion Procedure
Release  (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/
2008/0803.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. 07-02, FCPA Review Opinion Pro-
cedure Release (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opin-
ion/2007/0702.pdf.
73 Joe Palazzolo et al., Probe Widens into Dealings Between Finance Firms, Libya,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2014; see also Richard Cassin, Hedge Fund Manager Och-Ziff
Discloses FCPA Probe, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 20, 2014, 3:08 AM), http://www.fcpa.com/
blog/2014/3/20/hedge-fund-manager-och-ziff-discloses-fcpa-probe.html#.
74 Palazzolo, supra note 73.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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lion hotel project that has yet to be completed.78 This case demon-
strates the tension between the United States’ desire to police corrupt
practices and to encourage U.S. companies to enter developing coun-
tries. The fact is that companies can find themselves being punished
for something the government encouraged them to do.
Does this mean the government should dump the entire statute
and start anew? No, but it does show that there are holes in this stat-
ute and its regulatory system that need to be addressed. One possible
solution to this concern is outlined below.
IV. A NEW AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FOR COMPANIES ENTERING
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Here is another hypothetical: after adding a room to your
house, you walk into that room one day and notice that behind your
couch there is a hole in the wall. What do you do? Do you tear down the
wall and have it rebuilt, or do you pull out your tools and patch the
hole? Hopefully, you make the economic decision to patch the hole in-
stead of rebuilding. Like a hole in a wall, there is a hole in the statute.
What shall we do? The U.S. government can do exactly what the sys-
tem is supposed to do in these cases and tweak the statute by amend-
ing it slightly to provide for companies to enter emerging markets with
less fear about their own government coming down on them.
What this article proposes is a new affirmative defense that
would allow U.S. companies to get approval to enter countries exiting
major internal strife and, as a result, be safe from close scrutiny by the
DOJ and SEC. This is basically a cross between a compliance defense
and the current practice of DOJ issuing opinions on what constitutes
corrupt action.79 As a result, it satisfies concerns of both sides of this
issue, by giving companies a bit more room to take the risk of entering
these markets that desperately need foreign direct investment, while
still promoting the goal of encouraging clean business.
As with most things in government, this would necessarily be a
multi-step process. A company like IP, could approach the Fraud Sec-
tion of the DOJ80, or likely a smaller division within that section, with
78 Id.
79 One provision of the FCPA that I have not discussed in detail is the practice of
DOJ issuing opinions on what constitutes actionable conduct. This power is given
to the Attorney General in the statute and is regularly used to clarify the rules
concerning the FCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e); see also Mike Koehler, An Exami-
nation of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Issues, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 317,
355–57 (2013) (discussing the guidance system).
80 See U.S. Department of Justice, About the Fraud Section, THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud (last visited Jan.
10, 2014).
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its proposal to enter a foreign market exiting major internal strife,
which we have previously defined as a major natural disaster or politi-
cal upheaval. This proposal should give a brief summary of the circum-
stances in the foreign nation, as well as the reasons why the company
desires to enter that market. The core of this proposal should be a de-
tailed plan for how the company plans to oversee their employees and
operations in that market and ensures implementation of anti-corrup-
tion measures. If the program was sufficient, the DOJ, along with the
SEC could sign off on the program, allow the company to enter the
market, and the DOJ and SEC would only investigate if there were
reports of rampant, blatant corruption.
To be clear, following this procedure would not exempt compa-
nies from the FCPA. Instead, it would increase the threshold of when
action should be taken. The new defense should only apply for a rela-
tively short period of time, say four years. This would allow the com-
pany time to enter the market, get their business up and running, and
hopefully have a positive influence on the country. Additionally, com-
panies do not have to follow this procedure to enter that market, but
without following this procedure they would remain under the same
level of scrutiny they currently face.
The point of this policy is not to defang or destroy the FCPA,
but to fix a fundamental conflict between two major policy concerns
involved in the legislation. On one hand, you have the desire to dis-
courage and even eradicate corporate corruption by American compa-
nies wherever they may preside.81 On the other hand, you have the
goal of promoting economic growth throughout the world, and espe-
cially in developing markets.82 As it currently stands, these two poli-
cies are in conflict when it comes to U.S. companies entering
developing markets and especially markets exiting major internal
strife. This proposal finds a happy medium by requiring companies to
continue to fight corruption in their midst as well as allowing them to
enter into lucrative markets that are desperately in need of their
business.
One potential way to evaluate this idea is to look at the policies
of other countries toward their own companies. One great example is
China. While China has long outlawed the paying of commercial
bribes, it only recently amended its Criminal Code to prohibit bribes to
81 This is most evident in Senator Proxmire’s statements at the beginning of the
hearings that led to the FCPA. See Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S.
3133 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong. (1976), microformed on CIS No. 76-S241-38 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
82 See USAID Sudan, About Us: USAID Mission, EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES:
SOUTH SUDAN, http://southsudan.usembassy.gov/embassy-sections/usaid-mission.
html (last visited Jan.17, 2014).
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foreign governments.83 While this amendment has been compared to
the FCPA, China’s enforcement of their anti-bribery statutes outside
China falls far short of the U.S.’s efforts in this area.84 Given that it is
only two years old and it did take the U.S. a few decades to aggres-
sively begin enforcing the FCPA, some benefit of the doubt can be
given to China. Still, despite the relatively young age of China’s law it
is enlightening to see how this is affecting Chinese companies’ invest-
ments in foreign countries, especially those in Africa.
China, along with its other BRICS partners (Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, and South Africa), made the conscious choice to focus their invest-
ments in Africa. China especially has focused much of its outgoing
investments into Africa.85 In fact, as of last year 49 of the continent’s
54 nations had formalized diplomatic ties to China.86 The point here is
that China, on a national level has made the decision to invest into the
African continent, which has led Chinese companies to follow suit. If
China is so interested in promoting investment in Africa, why would
they hinder that by harming their own companies entering the mar-
ket? The answer is they would not, and neither should the U.S.
The FCPA plays a vital role in the larger policy of encouraging
transparency in business transactions, which is a noble and important
goal. At the time of its passage, it shattered international norms about
how business should conduct themselves in other countries, but this
law, like all law, is not perfect. Fortunately, the United States has a
mechanism to fix laws, through an amendment. What the FCPA needs
is a new affirmative defense that allows companies to enter into na-
tions exiting major internal strife with the regulators’ permission and
do the good work that follows.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1975, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act as a reaction to the scandal of Watergate. This law, which
criminalized bribery and other corrupt practices by U.S. companies in
foreign countries, was the first of its kind, but it would spark an inter-
83 Amy Riella & Holly J. Warrington, Expanding the Boundaries of China’s Anti-
Corruption Regime, 4 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 63, 63 (2012).
84 To this point there has been no reported cases of China actually enforcing this
amendment.
85 See 2 OLIVER C. RUPPEL ET. AL, CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 558 (2013) (Professor Ruppel devotes a chapter in this book
to the relationship between the BRICS partners and African nations. In particular
he provides great insights into China’s role in this policy).
86 See  Zhang Chun, A Promising Partnership between BRICS and Africa: A Chi-
nese Perspective, THE CHINA MONITOR, Mar. 2013, at 30–37.
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national movement to fight corruption in all its forms.87 A little over a
decade into the FCPA’s life, Congress identified the fundamental flaw
in the initial law, that its prohibitions were far too vague for a law
with such a wide reach. To solve this, Congress added an exception
(the facilitating payments exception) and two affirmative defenses (the
foreign law defense and reasonable bona fide expenditure).88 All three
of which went a long way in fixing the flaws with the FCPA.
The importance of understanding the FCPA skyrocketed once
enforcement began in earnest. In the mid-2000s a fundamental change
in the importance of the FCPA occurred when the Department of Jus-
tice and the Securities and Exchange Commission began aggressively
enforcing the FCPA.89 Companies quickly realized that an FCPA vio-
lation could cost them millions and maybe even billions of dollars.90 In
this environment, it is likely that these companies began to pass up
good business opportunities out of fear of a sanction.
At the core of the FCPA is the need to balance two competing
policies. The promotion of transparent business practices stands as the
clearest policy behind the FCPA. This policy stands in tension with the
desire to promote Americans and for American companies to be active
in other countries, by  helping those in need. Because the United
States should be in the business of promoting both values involved, a
middle ground needs to be struck.
That middle ground is a new affirmative defense. To encourage
U.S. companies to enter markets exiting periods of civil war or in the
aftermath of a natural disaster, Congress should enact a defense to the
FCPA that allows companies to approach the DOJ and SEC with a
program for entering such a market without knowingly violating the
FCPA. If the regulators approved, the companies would be free from
close scrutiny for a period of a few years to really pour their efforts into
that market. This would not compromise the overall effectiveness of
the FCPA or hinder the policy toward transparency, because it would
have a limited application. The FCPA is an excellent example of Con-
gress responding to a crisis and making U.S. law better, but it needs
some work.
87 See OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in In-
ternational Business Transactions (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
88 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b-c)
89 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 43.
90 Id.
